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Abstract: Key-exchange protocols have been overlooked as a possible means for 
implementing oblivious transfer (OT). In this paper we present a protocol for 
mutual exchange of secrets, 1-out-of-2 OT and coin-flipping similar to Diffie-
Hellman protocol using the idea of obliviously exchanging encryption keys. 
Since, Diffie-Hellman scheme is widely used, our protocol may provide a useful 
alternative to the conventional methods for implementation of oblivious transfer 
and a useful primitive in building larger cryptographic schemes.  
 
1 Introduction 
 
Oblivious transfer (OT), discussed by Stephen Wiesner as conjugate coding [1] became popular 
when Rabin described a scheme for mutual exchange of secrets [2]. This combined with 1-out-
of-2 oblivious transfer led to the development of numerous cryptographic tools.  
 
An oblivious transfer protocol is a scheme in which Alice transfers to Bob a secret without 
knowing if Bob received it, while Bob may or may not receive the secret, each happening with a 
certain probability, usually one-half. Such a scheme using Elliptic Curve Cryptography has been 
discussed in [3]. 
In this paper we construct a protocol for oblivious transfer using key exchange similar to Diffie-
Hellman (DH) protocol [4], which is a popular method for establishing a shared key between two 
parties over an insecure channel. We modify the Diffie-Hellman protocol such that the two 
communicating parties will succeed or fail in establishing a shared key each with a probability of 
one-half. However, the party sending the secret will not know if the receiver has the same key as 
he/she does. 
There have been implementations [5,6] of 1-out-of-n OT based on the Decision Diffie-Hellman 
(DDH) problem [7]. However, our protocol differs from previous ones in the sense that - firstly, 
we describe a scheme for mutual exchange of secrets based on DH. Secondly, in the previous 
implementations the 1-out-of-n OT use the DDH for the transfer itself, i.e. applies the Diffie-
Hellman exponentiation for the encryption of secrets directly. Here we administer the idea of the 
oblivious key exchange. Once the keys are exchanged (obliviously), the parties may use any 
mutually agreed encryption method for the actual transfer / exchange of secrets. 
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The security of our protocol arises from the fact that the problem of determining an exponent e  
given x , y  and a prime p , such that ypxe =mod  is equivalent to solving a Discrete Log 
Problem (DLP) efficiently. 
The participants choose numbers p  and x , such that p  is a large prime on the order of at least 
300 decimal digits (1024 bits), 1−p  has a large prime factor and x  is a generator of order 1−p  
in the multiplicative group pΖ  (a generator is a primitive root of p ). This ensures the security of 
the protocols not only against eavesdroppers but also against the opposing party, which is to be 
considered as an adversary as well. Since we will be working only in pΖ , we often do not state it 
explicitly. 
The proof that the security of Rabin’s cryptosystem is equivalent to a factorization problem led 
to the development of the zero-knowledge proof [8]. In such a proof a prover tries to convince a 
verifier that he possesses certain information but he does not disclose the information but only 
the proof that he possesses the information. With every iteration of the algorithm, the probability 
of an imposter cheating a verifier decreases exponentially. We will discuss a scheme for zero-
knowledge proof based on the discrete log problem. 
2 Mutual exchange of secrets 
 
Suppose Alice and Bob possess secrets AS  and BS  respectively, which they wish to exchange, 
however, they do not trust each other. We would like to complete the exchange without a trusted 
third party and without a procedure for simultaneous exchange of secrets; the latter being 
practically impossible to implement when the parties are geographically far apart. Both parties 
are assumed to have an appropriate mechanism to digitally sign every message they send. 
Let the secrets AS  and BS  be passwords to files that Bob and Alice want to access such that if a 
wrong password is used then the files will self-destruct. This prevents the parties from trying 
random passwords. The protocol is based on the oblivious exchange of encryption keys. 
The Protocol: We exploit the fact that there exist pgg Ζ∈21, , 21 gg ≠  such that they map to a 
single cipher c , where pgpgc modmod 22
2
1 == . Let AK  denote the key that Alice uses to 
encrypt her secret, while Bob uses BK  to encrypt his secret. With these assumptions, the 
protocol proceeds as follows: 
1. Alice and Bob agree upon a prime p , a number px Ζ∈  as the generator and c  such that 
pgpgc modmod 22
2
1 ==  (Alice and Bob both know 1g  and 2g ). 
2. Alice privately chooses 1gg A =  or 2gg A =  and two random numbers 1AN  and 2AN . 
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3. Bob secretly decides on Bg , such that 1ggB =  or 2ggB =  and a random number BN . 
4. Alice sends to Bob: px AA Ng mod1+  and px AN mod2 . 
5. Bob sends to Alice: p
x
x
B
B
AA
N
g
Ng
mod
1
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
 and computes ( ) pxK BA NNA mod2=′  for himself. 
6. Alice computes: p
x
xK
A
A
B
B
AA N
N
N
g
Ng
A mod
1
2
1
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
+
. 
7. Bob chooses a random message M and sends ( )AKMfC ′= ,  to Alice. 
8. Alice sends back ( )AKCfY ,1−=  to Bob.  
),( kmfc =  is a function known to both Alice and Bob, where m  is the input, k  is the key and 
knowing c  does not reveal the key used. f  may be an encryption function using a secret key 
and 1−f  is the decryption function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                               Compare with M  to determine if AA KK =′ or AA KK ≠′  
 
Illustration of proposed algorithm to achieve oblivious exchange of encryption key (all computations 
performed in pΖ ). 
Bob 
( ) MandNggg BB ,, 21∈
( ) BA NNA xK 2=′
( )21, gggA ∈
21 AA NandN
Alice 
Alice 
( )[ ] 121 AABABA NNNNggA xK +−= Bob 
Mutual agreement: 
1. prime p  such that 1−p  has a large prime factor. 
2. a number px Ζ∈  that is a primitive root of p . 
3. a number  c , where pgpgc modmod 2221 == . 
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Two cases arise from the above sequence, namely BA gg =  and BA gg ≠ . If BA gg =  then 
AA KK =′ , else AA KK ≠′ . Hence, Bob receives AK  with probability one-half. Steps 7 and 8 help 
Bob check if he has AK  by comparing Y  and M . 
Similarly, exchange of key BK  takes place from Bob to Alice.  
Define states, 
⎩⎨
⎧=
.,
.,
A
A
b KreceivenotdidBobifK
KreceivedBobifK
U  
where, pK Ζ∈  and K  is the bitwise complement of K . aU  is similarly defined. 
In order to prevent cheating by either party, Alice sends Aa SU ⊕  to Bob and Bob sends Bb SU ⊕  
to Alice. Since, neither party knows other’s state of knowledge of the secret key, this step does 
not provide either party with any knowledge of other’s secret.  
Finally, Alice and Bob exchange their secrets encrypting them using AK  and BK , respectively.  
If at the last step, after Alice sends her encrypted secret to Bob, Bob was to cheat and not send 
his secret to Alice, then the fact that Bob cheated implies that Bob received AK  and KUb =  and 
that Bob had previously sent BBb SKSU ⊕=⊕ . Alice can retrieve BS  by computing 
BB SKSK =⊕⊕ . 
The probability, after the protocol is complete, that neither party knows other’s secret key is one-
fourth. 
Example: Alice and Bob wish to exchange secrets AS  and BS . They agree upon 23=p , 5=x  
and 9=c . Therefore, 3mod 1 == gpc  and 20mod 2 == gpc . Two cases arise beginning 
from step 2 of the algorithm. Let us examine them: 
Case I:  BA gg =  
2. Alice chooses: 31 == ggA  and two random numbers 51 =AN  and 152 =AN . 
3. Bob chooses: 31 == ggB  and 17=BN . 
4. Alice sends to Bob: 1623mod5mod 531 == ++ px AA Ng  and  
                                            1923mod5mod 152 ==px AN . 
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5. Bob sends to Alice: 
 ( )
( ) 723mod716
23mod12516
23mod
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5
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⎞
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⎛
−
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p
x
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B
B
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 and computes for himself: ( ) 2123mod19mod 172 ===′ pxK BA NNA . 
6. Alice computes: ( ) 2123mod7mod 5151
2
1 ==⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
+
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A . 
Bob may encrypt a random message with the key that he has generated and ask Alice to decrypt 
it using her key to determine if he has AK . Since Alice and Bob have chosen 3== BA gg , then 
21==′ AA KK . ( 20== BA gg  gives similar results.) 
Case II:  BA gg ≠  
2. Alice chooses: 31 == ggA  and two random numbers 51 =AN  and 152 =AN . 
3. Bob chooses: 202 == ggB  and 17=BN . 
4. Alice sends to Bob: 1623mod5mod 531 == ++ px AA Ng  and  
                                            1923mod5mod 152 ==px AN . 
5. Bob sends to Alice: 
 ( )
( ) 923mod216
23mod1216
23mod
12
1623mod
5
5mod
17
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1717
20
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=×=
×=
⎟⎠
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⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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 and computes for himself: ( ) 2123mod19mod 172 ===′ pxK BA NNA . 
6. Alice computes: ( ) 1623mod9mod 5151
2
1 ==⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
+
p
x
xK
A
A
B
B
AA N
N
N
g
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A . 
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In this case, Alice and Bob have chosen BA gg ≠ , hence AA KK ≠′ . ( 20=Ag  and 3=Bg  yields 
similar results.) 
In none of the cases can Bob can predict before hand what choice Alice has made, so the 
protocol remains fair.  
Security issues: The protocol breaks down if Bob is able to compute both ( ) px BA NN mod2  and 
( )[ ] px AABABA NNNNgg mod121+− . We see that Bob can deduce 1ANx  and 2ANx , using which he may 
compute px
x
x y
N
N
A
A
mod
1
2 = . Given 
12 AA
NNy −= , deducing y  is a DLP. If we assume that some 
how Bob is able to deduce y , then in order for him to compute the ratio 
1
2
A
A
N
N
, he still needs to 
know either 
1A
N  or 
2A
N , which is again equivalent to a DLP. Based on the assumption that a 
Discrete Log Problem is difficult to solve, the protocol remains secure. 
 
3 One-out-of-two oblivious transfer 
 
One of the most powerful primitives that have led to the invention of numerous cryptographic 
schemes is the one-out-of-two oblivious transfer. It may conceptually be described as a black 
box where Alice puts in two secrets, 1S  and 2S , such that Bob can only retrieve one of them 
while getting no information about the other. Bob is concerned that Alice should not know which 
secret he retrieved. 
A situation may be such that a spy wishes to sell one out of two secrets that he possesses, while 
the buyer does not wish the spy to know which information he wants. In such a situation the 1-
out-of-2 oblivious transfer can be employed. It is assumed that the party possessing the two 
secrets is willing to disclose one and only one of these to the other. 
The procedure of choosing prime p , generator number x  and pgpgc modmod 22
2
1 ==  
remains identical to that described before. However, this time Alice uses secret keys 1K  and 2K  
to encrypt secrets 1S  and 2S , respectively. She announces to Bob that she is associating key 1K  
with 1g  and key 2K  with 2g . With these initial conditions the protocol follows: 
1. Alice secretly chooses 
1A
N  and sends to Bob: px ANg mod11 + . 
2. Bob chooses 1ggB = (if he wants secret 1S ) or 2ggB =  (if he wants secret 2S ) and 
secret numbers BN  and 1BN . 
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3. Bob sends to Alice: p
x
x
BB
B
A
NN
g
Ng
mod
1
11
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
 and px BN mod . 
4. Alice chooses a number 
2A
N  and sends to Bob: p
x
x
A
BB
B
A
NNN
g
Ng
mod
2
1
11
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
. 
5. Bob computes: p
x
xp
x
xK
AB
B
AB
ABB
B
A
NN
g
NgNNNN
g
Ng
B modmod
2
111
21
11
1
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
++
. 
6. Alice computes: pxK AAB NNN mod211 =  and ( )( ) pxK AAB NNggN mod21212 +−= . 
7. Alice encrypts secret 1S  using 1K  and secret 2S  using 2K  and sends them to Bob. 
From the above sequence we see that if Bob chooses 1ggB = , then 1KKB =  and if Bob chooses 
2ggB = , then 2KKB = . Hence, Bob will only be able to retrieve one of the two secrets 
depending upon his choice, while Alice will not be able to determine which secret Bob has 
retrieved. 
Security issues: In order for Bob to cheat, he needs to compute both 1K  and 2K . His best option 
is to determine one of the keys honestly and using that, try to deduce the other key. For instance, 
if Bob honestly computes 1K , then he will have access to 1
ANx  and 
1
21
A
AA
N
NN
x
x . But this does not 
provide him with any information about 
1A
N  and 
2A
N  which he needs to compute 2K . Similarly, 
he cannot calculate 1K  from 2K . The problem is again equivalent to efficiently solving a DLP. 
4 Coin-Flipping Protocols 
 
A couple may decide on which restaurant to go to or whether they should take a vacation or buy 
a car for their next anniversary, by tossing a coin. In this case flipping a coin is a trivial matter 
since both parties are present at the same place physically. However, problems arise when the 
participants are geographically separated over large distances. How are they supposed to fairly 
flip a coin when both of them cannot see the outcome simultaneously? Many business 
transactions require such an arrangement or a simple game of gambling over the Web may need 
a fair coin-toss. Numerous solutions exist for this purpose that employ cryptographic techniques 
of bit commitment [9, 10].  
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It turns out that any oblivious transfer scheme may be suitably modified to flip a coin, so can be 
the protocol for mutual exchange of secrets that we have presented. For instance, if Bob receives 
the same key as Alice then Bob wins the toss else Alice wins. After Bob declares the key he has 
computed, Alice replies if he won or lost and reveals all the variables that she had chosen which 
Bob can use to verify Alice’s claim. Bob may not disclose any of the variables of his choice. 
5 Zero-Knowledge Proofs 
 
Introduced in 1985, zero-knowledge proofs are typically used to force malicious parties to 
behave according to a predetermined protocol. In addition to their direct applicability to 
cryptography, they serve as a good benchmark for the study of various problems regarding 
cryptographic protocols [11, 12, 13]. Here we discuss a protocol for a prover P  to convince a 
verifier V  that he possesses certain information without disclosing the actual information. We 
may formally describe the problem as the following: P  declares a y , such that pxy e mod= , 
where p  is a prime and px Ζ∈ . y , x  and p  may be global information. However, only P  
knows the exponent e . For everyone else, determining e  is a DLP. The problem is for P  to 
convince V  that he knows the value of e  without disclosing it. The protocol may proceed as 
follows: 
1. P  chooses a random integer n  and sends ( ) pxpxX enne modmod ==  to V . 
2. V  chooses a random bit b . If  0=b , 0=M ; else he chooses a random m  and sets 
pxM m mod=  and sends ( )Mb,  to P . 
3. If 0=b , P  sends n  to V ; else P  sends pxpMY mee modmod ==  to V . 
4. When 0=b , V  verifies X  is equal to pxpy enn modmod = . So he believes that P  
knows the value of n . If 1=b , V  verifies if Y  is equal to pxpy emm modmod = . So he 
is convinced that P  knows the value of e . 
This is a single round of the protocol. Upon multiple rounds of the protocol, the probability of an 
imposter cheating the verifier decreases exponentially.  
We see that an imposter who does not know e  will succeed with a probability of one-half in 
each round. This is because if V  starts communicating with an imposter P′  from round one, 
then when 0=b , P′  successfully completes the protocol, but when 1=b , then P′  will have to 
guess the value of e . Hence, after t  iterations, the probability of the verifier being cheated 
decreases to t−2 . The protocol is zero-knowledge because P  never sends e , but only uses it as 
an exponent. This makes it equivalent to Discrete-Log-Problem. 
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A zero-knowledge proof can be used for identification if the verifier knows the value of e , 
which acts like a password. The prover has to convince the verifier that he knows the password, 
without actually giving it out. This is because the verifier may be an imposter trying to determine 
the password by cheating. 
6 Conclusion 
 
Our algorithm opens up the possibility of development of oblivious transfer schemes using key 
exchange protocols. Academically, it appears that such algorithms should have preceded Rabin’s 
protocol. It shows that there exist numerous variations on the implementation of OT protocols. 
Also, most OT schemes can be extended to coin flipping with minor modifications, in which 
case, only one sided transfer may take place and success or failure depends on the opposing party 
being lucky enough to deduce the key. 
Our protocol is different from Rabin’s protocol in the sense that the latter aims at obliviously 
transmitting the decryption key from the transmitter to the receiver whereas we establish a shared 
key between the transmitter and receiver with probability one-half. Higher exponents may be 
employed to generate transfer probabilities other than one-half. It turns out that the Diffie-
Hellman protocol is a powerful primitive and can be used as a basis for implementing many 
cryptographic protocols that have been implemented via the RSA type transformations. This 
possibility had been overlooked. 
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